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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution guarantees that no state government will deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The Due
Process Clause has both procedural and substantive components.' Substan-
tive due process rights arise only from the Constitution itself.2 Federal courts
consistently have held that the substantive component of the due process
right does not guarantee safe and sanitary housing.3 In addition to substan-
tive due process, the Fourteenth Amendment requires procedural due process
upon a governmental deprivation of a life, liberty or property interest. 4 The
United States Supreme Court has held that a liberty interest arises either
from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law.5 Every state statute
or regulation, however, does not automatically create a liberty interest.6
Until recently, courts had not considered whether state laws regulating
housing create a liberty interest in safe and sanitary housing that would
enjoy protection under the procedural component of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause.
The Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. sections 3604 (a) and (b)
(Title VIII), forbids discrimination in housing sales and rentals and in the
provision of housing services on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Successful prosecution of a Title VIII claim requires that
the plaintiff show that the defendant actually made housing unavailable to
the plaintiff. The plaintiff also must show that a discriminatory intent
triggered the defendant's denial of housing or housing services or that the
1. See Regents of Univ.of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985) (noting that
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees both substantive and procedural rights);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 (1982) (recognizing that Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause guarantees certain substantive rights as well as minimal process upon deprivation
of life, liberty or property).
2. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 229 (stating that only Constitution creates substantive Due
Process rights); Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315 (recognizing that Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause itself creates substantive rights).
3. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (holding that Constitution holds no
guarantee that housing will meet certain minimum standard); see also Perry v. Housing Auth.,
486 F. Supp. 498, 503 (D.S.C.) (noting that substantive due process does not encompass right
to adequate housing), aff'd, 664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1980).
4. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) (holding that procedural
due process is necessary only when liberty or property interests are at stake); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (same).
5. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983) (noting that sources of liberty interests
include state law and Due Process Clause); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982)
(recognizing rights of states to give liberty interests other than those guaranteed by Due Process
Clause).
6. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471 (holding that mere creation of guidelines for adminis-
trative segregation of prisoners does not automatically give rise to liberty interest in being in
general prison population).
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defendant's seemingly nondiscriminatory actions had a disparate impact on
minorities.
In Edwards v. Johnson County Health Dept., 885 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir.
1989), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
whether a county health department's issuance of permits for substandard
migrant farmworker housing violated Title VIII and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment substantive and procedural due process rights of six black migrant
farmworkers. Local farmers who employed the plaintiffs in Edwards re-
quired the plaintiff farmworkers to live in housing on their farms as a
condition of the plaintiffs' employment. The plaintiffs, who lived in the
facilities during the spring and summer of 1985, asserted that the housing
provided by the farmers violated state health and safety standards for
migrant farmworker housing. The Johnson County Health Department
(JCHD) had issued permits for the housing despite the fact that the housing
did not meet the state's health and safety standards. According to the
plaintiffs, the JCHD also failed to train properly its inspectors and failed
to ensure that the inspectors made required periodic inspections after issuing
the permits. The plaintiffs alleged that by issuing the permits and failing to
make the required inspections the JCHD violated the plaintiffs' substantive
and procedural due process rights, as well as Title VIII, and, therefore,
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina.
The district court dismissed the farmworkers' suit for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court reasoned that
the Constitution created no substantive right to safe and sanitary housing
and that the state law involved did not create a liberty interest in safe and
sanitary housing. Furthermore, the district court found that the plaintiffs
failed to allege a violation of Title VIII.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiffs argued that adequate
housing is a right guaranteed by the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause. The plaintiffs also argued that the JCHD violated the
plaintiffs' right to procedural due process because the state had created a
liberty interest in adequate housing by establishing the state health and
safety standards for housing and that the county had deprived them of that
liberty interest without meeting minimum procedural due process standards.
In addition to their constitutional claims, the plaintiffs alleged that the
JCHD's issuance of unwarranted housing permits violated Title VIII because
the issuance made safe and sanitary housing unavailable to the plaintiffs
on the basis of their race and illegally discriminated against the plaintiffs
in the provision of housing inspection services on the basis of race.
The Fourth Circuit first examined the plaintiffs' substantive due process
claim. The Fourth Circuit followed the well-accepted rule that the substantive
component of the Due Process clause does not guarantee safe and sanitary
housing. The Edwards court noted that under DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dept. of Social Services, 109 S.Ct. 998 (1989), the Due Process
clause does not impose upon a state a duty to protect its citizens from
private actors' wrongdoing, but imposes obligations on the state only after
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
the state itself deprives a citizen of a liberty interest. Because the local
government in Edwards never had the plaintiffs in its custody, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the JCHD had no duty to provide adequate housing
for the plaintiffs under substantive due process theory.
The Fourth Circuit next examined the plaintiffs' procedural due process
claim. The Fourth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs had no liberty
interest in safe and sanitary housing. Although the Fourth Circuit recognized
that certain state statutes and regulations may create liberty interests for
procedural due process purposes, the Edwards court distinguished those
regulations from the regulations at issue because those regulations involved
the liberty interest of prisoners in parole and other statutory entitlements.
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that under Milburn v. Anne Arundel County
Dept. of Social Services, 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989), the state must have
deprived a party of freedom before a liberty interest is implicated. Because
the required inspections did not affect the plaintiffs' freedom in choosing
where to live and work, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the inspections
did not create a liberty interest that required procedural due process before
denial.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit considered the plaintiffs' Title VIII claim.
The Fourth Circuit recognized that to establish a violation of section 3604(a)
of Title VIII, a plaintiff must assert first, that the defendants actually made
housing unavailable to the plaintiffs, and second, that the plaintiffs' race,
color, religion, sex or national origin motivated the defendants' actions. In
applying this test in Edwards, the Fourth Circuit determined that the
plaintiffs failed to meet either of the test's requirements. With regard to
the first prong, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the JCHD's issuance of
the permits did not actually make housing unavailable to the plaintiffs. In
fact, the court noted, the JCHD's issuance of the permits actually increased
the amount of housing available, although that housing was substandard.
The Fourth Circuit recognized that Congress intended that courts construe
Title VIII broadly, but declined the plaintiffs' invitation to depart from the
plain meaning of the term "housing" by interpreting that term to mean
housing meeting certain safety and health standards.
The Fourth Circuit also found that the plaintiffs failed the second prong
of the test under section 3604(a) of Title VIII by failing to allege that racial
discrimination motivated the JCHD's actions. Although the plaintiffs con-
ceded that the permit policy was facially neutral, they contended that it
violated Title VIII because the policy had a disparate impact on blacks;
most of the migrant farm worker population in Johnson County was black.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument and contended
that the proper approach to the issue was to analyze whether the permit
policy had a disproportionate impact on minorities within the migrant
farmworker class. Because the plaintiffs failed to allege that the policy
resulted in disparity of housing conditions between black and white migrant
farmworkers, the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs could not pass the
second prong of the test under section 3604(a).
The Fourth Circuit briefly turned to the plaintiffs' contention that the
defendants violated section 3604(b) of Title VIII by discriminating against
1991]
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the plaintiffs in the provision of housing related services. The court refused
to consider this contention because the defendants failed to raise the issue
at the district court level. Furthermore, the court reiterated that the plaintiffs
failed to show a disparate impact on blacks, as compared to whites, in the
provision of housing services and that it would not consider the question
whether the housing inspections actually were housing "services" within the
meaning of that word in Title VIII.
The Edwards court determined that the plaintiffs failed to state viola-
tions of substantive or procedural due process rights under the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution or of Title VIII.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court to grant
the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Edwards is consistent
with traditional substantive and procedural due process analysis. The United
States Supreme Court has refused to recognize that housing is a substantive
due process right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.7 Furthermore,
the Fourth Circuit's refusal to find that the plaintiffs had a protected liberty
interest in safe and sanitary housing reflects courts' concern about creating
liberty interests when the statute involved actually does not effect a person's
physical freedom.8 Past courts have held that the proper approach for
determining disparate impact in Title VIII cases is to examine a measure's
impact on the minorities within the total group to which the measure
applied. 9 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the disparate impact problem
in Edwards also is consistent with past Title VIII analysis.'0
In 1971, pursuant to a mandate of the new Virginia Constitution adopted
in that year, the Virginia General Assembly created the Judicial Inquiry and
Review Commission. The Commission has the power "to investigate charges
which would be the basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a judge. '" '
The Virginia Constitution states that proceedings before the Commission
must be confidential. 2 Virginia Code section 2.1-37.13 states in part:
All papers filed with and proceedings before the Commission,
... including the identification of the subject judge as well as all
testimony and other evidence and any transcript thereof made by a
7. See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74 (refusing to hold that substantive due process rights
include safe and sanitary housing).
8. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472 (holding that inmate's right to remain in general prison
population rather than administrative segregation was state-created liberty interest curtailing
further confinement without due process).
9. See Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 987 (4th Cir. 1974) (stating that
with regard to disparate impact on minorities, important impact to examine is impact on
minorities as part of the group to which policy applies).
10. See id. at 986-87 (holding that Title VIII violation may result from facially neutral
policy that results in disparate impact on minorities, but that proper impact to examine is
impact on minorities within the group to which policy applies generally).
II. VA. CoNsT. art. VI, § 10.
12. Id.
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reporter, shall be confidential and shall not be divulged, other than
to the Commission, by any person who either files a complaint with
the Commission, or receives such complaint in an official capacity,
or investigates such complaint, is interviewed concerning such com-
plaint by a member, employee or agent of the Commission, or
participates in any proceeding of the Commission, or the official
recording or transcription thereof except that the record of any
proceeding filed with the Supreme Court shall lose its confidential
character.
Section 2.1-37.13 declares that divulging information in violation of this
section is a misdemeanor.
When a plaintiff challenges a statute on First Amendment grounds,
arguing that the statute violates the plaintiff's constitutional right of free
speech, and the government counters that the statute is a valid time, place
or manner restriction, courts resolve the issue by using a two-step analysis
of the statute. 3 Under this analysis, the court first determines whether the
statute is content-neutral. 14 If the statute is content-neutral, the court then
considers whether the statute is a valid time, place and manner restriction
on speech.'5 If, however, the statute regulates speech on the basis of its
content, the court applies an exacting scrutiny or compelling interest test in
determining the constitutionality of the statute.16
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of Virginia Code
section 2.1-37.13, the predecessor to the present code section, in Landmark
13. See 3 R. RoTUNDA, J. Nowx & J. YoUNG, TREATIsE ON CoNsrrrutoNL LAw:
SUBsTAN CE AND PROCEDURE § 20.47, at 237 (1986) (discussing two-step form of analysis that
courts use to review time, place or manner restrictions).
14. See, e.g., Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (asserting that standards of
First Amendment require that expression not be restricted by government because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972) (stating that First Amendment means government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content); Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (asserting that government has no power to restrict expressive
activity because of its message).
15. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)) (stating that time, place and manner
restrictions must be content-neutral); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984) (stating that
to be constitutional time, place and manner restriction, statute may not be based upon content
of speech). In Regan the Court set out the three-part test for constitutionality: To be a
constitutional time, place, and manner regulation, a statute may not be based upon either
content or subject matter of speech, must serve a significant governmental interest, and must
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Id.
16. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (quoting Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S.
312, 321 (1988)) (holding that speech regulated on basis of content must be tested against most
exacting scrutiny); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that most exacting scrutiny
is required in cases where state undertakes to regulate speech on basis of its content); United
States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (holding that
if governmental regulation is based on content of speech or message, action must be scrntinized
very carefully).
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Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). In Landmark, a
newspaper publisher appealed conviction for divulging information in vio-
lation of section 2.1-37.13 of the Virginia Code. Under section 2.1-37.13,
a person could not divulge any information about papers filed with and
proceedings before the Commission, the identification of the judge under
investigation, or any testimony or other evidence, and no person could
disclose confidential information to anyone except the Commission. In
Landmark, the defendant's publication had reported on a pending inquiry
by the Commission and identified the judge whose conduct was being
investigated. The Supreme Court reversed the publisher's conviction, rea-
soning that a major purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs. Moreover, the Supreme Court declared
that the state interests advanced in imposing criminal sanctions were insuf-
ficient to justify the resulting infringements upon freedom of speech and
of the press. The Supreme Court observed that the First Amendment does
not permit the criminal punishment of third persons who are strangers to
proceedings before such a commission for divulging or publishing truthful
information regarding confidential proceedings of the commission unless
the state can prove that the disclosure constitutes a clear and present danger.
The Court noted that out-of-court comments on pending cases or grand
jury investigations did not constitute a clear and present danger to the
administration of justice. Thereafter, the Virginia Assembly amended section
2.1-37.13 to limit the confidentiality restrictions to participants in the
proceedings. The Assembly, however, has since made an exception for
judges under investigation who must divulge information in investigating
the allegations against the judge in preparation for Commission proceedings.
In Baugh v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission (JIRC), 907 F.2d
440 (4th Cir. 1990), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of the new provision. The two plaintiffs
in Baugh, an attorney and an individual who had been a party in a state
court proceeding, filed complaints against state judges with the Commission,
and thereafter received letters from the Commission warning that disclosure
of any information concerning their complaints could result in criminal
prosecution. Because neither record was filed with the Virginia Supreme
Court, the confidentiality restrictions of section 2.1-37.13 applied to plain-
tiffs, requiring that the plaintiffs keep confidential the contents of the
complaints as well as the fact that the complaints had been filed. The
plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that section 2.1-
37.13 violated their First Amendment right to free speech and their right
to petition the government under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
considered the constitutionality of Virginia Code section 2.1-37.13 under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Finding that the statute was content-
neutral, the district court reasoned that the statute banned all speech relating
to the Commission's proceedings. The district court reasoned further that,
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to the extent that this speech was coupled with criticism of the Commission,
the statute banned speech by both defenders and critics for the purpose of
promoting the substantial government interest in encouraging complainants
and witnesses to speak fully and truthfully. Additionally, the court deter-
mined that the Virginia statute left open alternative means of communica-
tion. Under the statute, a person who filed a complaint could not divulge
that the person had filed a complaint or what action the Commission had
taken. The person could disclose, however, the name of the judge and the
events that led the person to file the complaint. Finally, the district court
found that the incidental restriction on speech did not impermissibly burden
the plaintiffs' right to petition the government. Accordingly, the district
court upheld section 2.1-37.13 as constitutional.
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the district court
erred in holding that section 2.1-37.13 was a constitutionally valid time,
place and manner restriction. The Commission argued that the statute was
content-neutral because the statute did not bar criticism of judges and
applied equally to a judge's supporters and critics. The Comnmission argued
further that the statute was a valid time, place and manner restriction that
served a purpose unrelated to the content of the speech and had only
secondary effects on speech. Finally, the Commission asserted that the
statute was justified as an effective method for identifying unfit or disabled
judges and facilitating disciplinary action or the judge's removal from the
bench.
To resolve the issue, the Fourth Circuit reexamined first the district
court's finding that the statute was content-neutral. The Baugh court relied
upon the standard for content-neutrality as set forth in Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). In Ward, the Supreme Court observed
that government regulation of expressive activity is content-neutral only if
it is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. The
Supreme Court also noted that the controlling consideration is the govern-
ment's purpose, and that a regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the
content of expression is deemed neutral even if it has an incidental effect
on some speakers or messages.
Applying the Ward test, the Fourth Circuit analyzed section 2.1-37.13,
addressing the Commission's arguments for content-neutrality. The Baugh
court dismissed the Commission's argument that the statute was content-
neutral because it applied equally to a judge's supporters and critics,
reasoning that equal application of a statute is relevant only to viewpoint-
neutrality, which is concerned with limitations on speech on the basis of
the viewpoint expressed. The court asserted that a content-neutral analysis
should focus on the operation of the status of the speech, and not on the
identity of the speaker.
In addressing the Commission's argument that the statute was unrelated
to the content of speech and was a valid time, place and manner restriction,
the Fourth Circuit observed that unlike the zoning ordinance and camping
regulation that the Supreme Court upheld in the cases cited by the Com-
1991]
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mission, section 2.1-37.13 was a direct regulation of speech. The court
noted that a statute is content-neutral only if the justification for the statute
is unrelated to the content of the speech. The Baugh court then found that
the justification for the statute was very closely related to the content of
the speech. The effectiveness of the statute in motivating disabled or unfit
judges to resign voluntarily from the bench is reliant upon the judge's
knowledge that, by resigning, the judge can avoid public criticism that
might follow if complainants revealed that a complaint had been filed.
Accordingly, the Baugh court determined that, because the statute silenced
all speech related to the actual filing of a complaint with the Commission,
the section was not a regulation that had only the "secondary" or "inci-
dental" effect of restricting speech, but rather was a content-based restric-
tion. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, held that the district court had erred
in its finding that the statute was content-neutral.
The Fourth Circuit then re-evaluated the test for constitutionality that
the district court had applied. In Baugh, the district court applied a
substantial interest test to determine whether the statute was a reasonable
time, place and manner restriction. To determine the appropriate test, the
Fourth Circuit reviewed the Supreme Court decision in Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 321 (1988). In Boos, the Supreme Court held that a court must
subject a content based statute to the most exacting scrutiny; a standard
requiring that a statute be upheld only in the face of a compelling state
interest. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court incor-
rectly had applied the less stringent "substantial interest" test.
The Fourth Circuit also reversed the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs' claim that the statute violated their right to petition the govern-
ment. In so holding, the Baugh court observed that the district court's
conclusion rested on its erroneous assumption that the statute was only an
incidental restriction on speech in dismissing the plaintiffs' claim. Conse-
quently, the outcome would not necessarily be the same if the district court
had applied the compelling interest test and found that the statute was an
unconstitutional abridgement of free speech. The Fourth Circuit, therefore,
remanded the case for the district court to reconsider the statute's consti-
tutionality under the guidelines of Baugh.
A number of cases decided in other district courts, where plaintiffs
have challenged similar confidentiality provisions on First Amendment
grounds, are consistent with the Fourth Circuit's holding that the Virginia
confidentiality provision restricted speech on the basis of its content. 17 The
17. See Doe v. Florida Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, 748 F. Supp. 1520 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (holding that Florida constitutional prohibition on disclosure of fact that complaint had
been filed with Judicial Qualifications Commission was not valid time, place and manner
restriction on speech); Doe v. Supreme Court of Fla., 734 F. Supp. 981 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(holding that Florid& Bar Rule prohibiting complainant from disclosing information regarding
disciplinary proceedings was aimed directly at content of speech); Providence Journal Co. v.
Newton, 723 F. Supp. 846 (D.R.I. 1989) (stating that confidentiality provisions of Rhode
Island's government ethics law prohibiting public discussion of existence and content of
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Baugh opinion indicates that the court may find that assertions of traditional
justifications for confidentiality provisions, such as section. 2.1-37.13, which
are usually based upon the significant or substantial government interests
allegedly advanced by this type of provision,18 are merely smokescreens set
up to obscure the real governmental concerns with speech content that
underlie the provision. The Baugh opinion demonstrates that by offering
such justifications, defendants may not successfully avoid the strict scrutiny
that courts must apply to statutes that are not content-neutral. The practical
effect of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Baugh may be that defenders of
government-imposed confidentiality provisions who argue that the regulation
is a valid time, place and manner restriction will have to focus more
pointedly on the content-neutrality issue, because the Fourth Circuit's prob-
ing justification analysis will make content-neutrality a much more difficult
hurdle for defendants to overcome.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits states from establishing statutory schemes
that give property owners more power than non owners in voting on local
government issues.19 The Fourth Circuit has held that once a state or local
government establishes the right to vote on an issue of general importance,
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from creating a system
that favors the votes of property owners over those who do not own
property3 ° When the statute involved does not extend the right to vote on
the issue, however, allowing a majority of landowners to authorize certain
actions does not violate equal protection principles. 2' For example, a statute
that allows for annexation upon the filing of a petition by seventy-five
percent of landowners in the area to be annexed and a majority vote by
the governing body of the annexing area does not violate the Equal Pro-
complaint filed against public official are "prototypical content-based regulations of protected
speech").
18. See Baugh v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Comm'n (JIRC), 907 F.2d 440, 445 (4th
Cir. 1990) (discussing justification Commission advanced for § 2.1-37.13); Doe v. Florida
Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, 748 F. Supp. at 1526 (discussing four principal interests
asserted by JQC offered in justification for confidentiality provision, including prevention of
damage to reputation of judges and judiciary, facilitation of effective investigations, and
protection of judge's constitutional right to privacy).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring states to provide equal protection of
law); Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 300 (1975) (striking down requirement that voters in bond
referendum be registered property owners in locality concerned); Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d
187, 190 (4th Cir.) (invalidating statutory annexation process requiring favorable vote of
majority of property owners as well as majority of voters in locality involved), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 959 (1978).
20. See Hayward, 573 F.2d at 190 (finding that government may not effectively disen-
franchise citizens who do not own property in matters that affect all citizens in jurisdiction).
21. See Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that statutory
provision allowing annexation upon filing of petition by 75% of landowners in area to be
annexed and majority vote of governing body of annexing area did not violate Equal Protection
Clause).
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tection Clause because the voters in the area to be annexed never had the
right to vote on that issue. 22 Against this background, the Fourth Circuit,
in Muller v. Curran, 889 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.
1121 (1990), considered whether a Maryland statute relating to incorporation
of an unincorporated area met the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause.
The statute at issue in Muller set out three requirements for incorpo-
ration of an unincorporated area. First, interested citizens had to file a
petition to the county council signed by at least twenty percent of the
registered voters in the area to be incorporated. The statute also required
that the owners of at least twenty-five percent of the assessed value of the
real property in the area to be annexed sign the petition. Second, the city
council, in its discretion, had to decide whether to submit the issue of
incorporation to the voters in the area to be annexed. Third, the Maryland
statute required that the locality involved hold a general election in which
all registered voters could vote.
The plaintiff in Muller, a registered voter of the area in question and
the village itself, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating the statute. The
district court denied declaratory relief. The plaintiff then appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the
statute was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause.
In examining the applicable law, the Fourth Circuit first noted that
under Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 187 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
959 (1978), once a locality extends the right to vote on an issue, restrictions
on that right outside of age, citizenship and residence requirements are
subject to strict scrutiny and that a locality could justify those restrictions
only upon showing furtherance of a compelling interest. The Fourth Circuit
also recognized, however, that when the citizens of a locality do not have
the right to vote on an issue, allowing property owners as a group to request
certain action does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Applying those
principles to Muller, the Fourth Circuit stressed that the Maryland statute's
requirement that the owners of twenty-five percent of the assessed value of
the real property in the area to be incorporated sign the petition allowed
that group to block the county council from even considering whether to
call for a general election. Thus, the Fourth Circuit determined that, because
the statute allowed property owners to project their wishes on a possibly
unwilling majority of voters, tfie state had to advance a compelling interest
to justify the statute. Because the state failed to show a compelling interest,
the Muller court invalidated the statute on the ground that the statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Fourth Circuit then considered whether remaining portions of the
statute were unseverable from the section requiring a petition signed by the
owners of twenty-five percent of the assessed value of the real estate in the
22. Id.
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area. The Fourth Circuit noted that state law governs the issue of severability
of a state statute and that in Maryland legislative intent controls the issue
of severability. Although under Maryland law a presumption in favor of
severability exists, the Muller court found that, because the Maryland
legislature rejected a version of the incorporation statute that contained no
role for property owners, the legislature did not intend for the statutory
process to survive without participation by property owners. Thus, the
Fourth Circuit held that the other portions of the statute were unseverable
and, therefore, struck down the entire Maryland statute.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the equal protection issues in Muller
is consistent with past decisions on equal protection and property ownership
requirements as a precondition to voting. The Fourth Circuit recognized
that when a state or local government allows a general vote on an issue, it
cannot dilute a majority vote or preclude such a vote on the basis of
property ownership. 23 In Muller, the Fourth Circuit applied that same
principle when it held the Maryland statute unconstitutional because the
statute allowed the property owners in an area to preclude the general
population from voting on an issue in.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against
the abridgement of free speech.2 The First Amendment does not protect
all forms of speech, but does protect commercial speech if the speech
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. 2 Even protected speech may
be subjected to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. 26 Govern-
mental restrictions on speech must pass differing degrees of scrutiny based
on an analysis of the openness of the property. 27 Courts generally consider
military bases as closed or non-public property and, therefore, subject to
more intrusive governmental restrictions. 2 With these considerations in
mind, the Fourth Circuit addressed restrictions placed on the distribution
23. Id.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. See Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980) (describing four part test to determine protected commercial speech).
26. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1983) (establishing degrees of judicial scrutiny associated with different categories of govern-
ment property); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Wiingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)
(invalidating ordinance banning "for sale" and "sold" signs for purpose of stemming "white
flight" from racially integrated town); City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (invalidating restrictions on speech at
public school board meeting).
27. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46 (establishing three categories of openness
associated with government owner property and degrees of judicial scrutiny associated with
each category of property).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (holding that military
base is not public forum); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (same); United States v.
McCoy, 866 F.2d 826, 833 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); M.N.C. of Hinesville, Inc. v. United States
Dept. of Defense, 791 F.2d 1466, 1473 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); Persons for Free Speech at
SAC v. United States Air Force, 675 F.2d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (same); United
States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194, 1205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 439 U.S. 967 (1978) (same).
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of circulars by the commanding officer of a military base in Shopco
Distribution Co. v. Commanding General of Marine Corps, Camp Lejeune,
N.C., 885 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1989). In Shopco the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the granting of prefer-
ential distribution rights to a government affiliated newspaper over similar
civilian publications constituted a violation of the right to freedom of
commercial speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. The defendant,
Commanding General of Camp Lejeune Marine Corps base, gave prefer-
ential distribution rights to a Civilian Enterprise Newspaper (CEN) over the
rights of other nonsubscription, nongovernmental publications. Typically, a
CEN contracts with the ,military to produce a newspaper primarily for
distribution to military personnel and their families at no cost to the
government. The CEN covers the costs of publishing and makes a profit
solely by selling advertisements. The base's public affairs staff controls the
editorial content of the CEN.
Plaintiff, Shopco Distribution Co. (Shopco), published The Globe as a
CEN for six years until Shopco lost the publishing contract following a
competitive bid process. Shopco also publishes an advertising circular known
as the Shopper. Shopco typically distributes the circular door-to-door in
residential areas. Shopco distributed the Shopper door-to-door in Camp
Lejeune's housing areas from the circular's inception in 1975. Shopco
continued to distribute the Shopper in Camp Lejeune's housing areas after
losing a competitive bid to produce The Globe in June 1987.
In July 1987, the Commanding General was informed that continued
door-to-door distribution of the Shopper adversely would affect the adver-
tising draw of The Globe and, therefore, adversely would affect the amount
of editorial space available for base articles in The Globe. In response, the
Commanding General issued a new Base Order which limited distribution
of nonsubscription, civilian publications by volume and distribution location
throughout the base. As a result of the new Base Order, Shopco began
distributing the Shopper by mail at a significant increase in cost over hand
delivery door-to-door.
Shopco contended that the Commanding General's new Base Order
threatened the economic viability of the Shopper. Additionally, Shopco
claimed that the base housing areas became public fora because of certain
activities permitted in the housing areas. Lastly, Shopco claimed that the
Commanding General created a public forum in the housing areas by
allowing door-to-door distributions in the past. Therefore, Shopco claimed
that the Commanding General's action violated Shopco's First Amendment
right to freedom of commercial speech. The district court granted the
Commanding General's motion for summary judgement and Shopco ap-
pealed.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit used a two-part test to evaluate Shopco's
First Amendment claim. First, the Fourth Circuit held that Shopco must
prove that the commercial speech in the instant case was protected speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment. According to the Shopco
court, to pass this first part of the test, the commercial speech must concern
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lawful activity and the speech must not be misleading. The Fourth Circuit
did not rule on this first test because the defendant stipulated that Shopco's
proposed speech met the criteria for protected commercial speech. According
to the Fourth Circuit, the second part of the test is a determination of
whether the governmental regulation of speech is justified. In answering
this second part of the test, the Fourth Circuit weighed two factors; the
type of forum where the speech took place and the nature of the government
restriction.
The Fourth Circuit adopted the framework of Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), for evaluating the type
of forum involved in Shopco and the level of scrutiny the court must apply
to the challenged government restrictions on speech. The framework from
Perry recognizes three categories of government property that provide a
continuum of greater to lesser protection of speech. Under the Perry
framework, First Amendment protection of speech is strongest in traditional
public forums such as public parks and streets. Courts apply strict- scrutiny
to restrictions on speech in traditionally public areas and only uphold
narrowly tailored restrictions that serve a compelling state interest. Accord-
ing to Perry, a middle ground for protecting speech exists in created public
forums, such as university meeting facilities. The government does not have
to allow speech in created public forums. If the government opens the
forum to the public, then speech in these areas receives the same level of
protection as in traditional public forums. Lastly, according to Perry, the
First Amendment allows the heaviest regulation of speech in nonpublic
government forums. In nonpublic government forums, restrictions on speech
must only be reasonable and unbiased.
Applying the framework from Perry to the case at bar, the Fourth
Circuit began by noting that courts generally consider a military base to be
a nonpublic government forum. The Fourth Circuit then addressed and
dismissed Shopco's claim that the base housing areas became public fora
because the Commanding General currently allowed civilian-run businesses
on the base, permitted pizza and laundry delivery in base housing, and
previously had allowed door-to-door delivery of nongovernment publica-
tions. First, the court noted that the Commanding General maintained
Camp Lejeune's housing areas as separate and distinct from civilian resi-
dential areas. The Commanding General limited access to all base housing
areas, maintaining armed sentries in some areas. The court reasoned that
the Commanding General's imposition and enforcement of access restrictions
on base housing preserved the housing areas as a nonpublic forum. Next,
the court compared each of the civilian activities allowed by the Com-
manding General to Shopco's proposed activity of delivering the Shopper
door-to-door. The court distinguished pizza and laundry delivery because
base residents solicit these deliveries. Then, the court reasoned that the
Shopper enjoyed a degree of freedom similar to that of the civilian-run
business because the Commanding General restricted both the businesses
and the Shopper to the sameareas on the base. Lastly, the Fourth Circuit
addressed whether the Commanding General's past authorization of door-
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to-door distributions of nongovernment publications opened the housing
areas as public fora for Shopco's speech. Relying on the holding in Perry,
the Fourth Circuit held that the Commanding General's past actions did
not prevent him from closing the forum to the public. In Perry, the Supreme
Court rejected a similar claim by an ousted teachers' union asserting that
the union's use of school mailboxes before losing a representation election
converted the mailboxes into a public forum.
After determining that the base housing areas were and continued to
be a nonpublic form, the Fourth Circuit applied the reasonableness standard
found in Perry for restrictions on speech in nonpublic forums. The Fourth
Circuit explained that to pass a First Amendment standard of reasonable-
ness, the restriction must be "viewpoint neutral" and "reasonable in light
of the purpose served." The Fourth Circuit held that the Commanding
General's circulation restriction met both these requirements. The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the Base Order was viewpoint neutral because the
order restricted all nongovernment publications except the CEN, and because
of the absence of evidence that the Commanding General agreed or disagreed
with material in any of the publications involved. The court further reasoned
that the special function the CEN served as a means for the Commanding
General to communicate with the personnel on the base at large made
preferential distribution for The Globe reasonable. Additionally, the court
noted that the necessary economic incentives involved in the contractual
arrangement between the government and The Globe made the Commanding
General's Base Order reasonable.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit in Shopco held that Camp Lejeune's
housing areas were nonpublic fora and that the Commanding General's
Base Order, which gave preferential distribution to the CEN, was unbiased
and reasonable in light of its purpose. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's order and granted summary judgement to the Com-
manding General. The decision in Shopco is in line with the great weight
of decisions holding that military bases are not a public forum, and brings
the Fourth Circuit in accord with a recent decision of the Eleventh Circuit.2 9
Subsection fourteen of the North Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act, N.C.
Gen. Stat. section 105-164.13(14) (the Tax Exemption), exempts the sale
and purchase of Holy Bibles from North Carolina's state retail sales and
use tax. In Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)
and Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), the United States
Supreme Court held unconstitutional two state statutes providing for state
tax exemptions.3 0 In those decisions, the Supreme Court first concluded that
29. See M.N.C. of Hinesville, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Defense, 791 F.2d 1446
(llth Cir. 1986) (authorizing preferential treatment of CEN's on military bases).
30. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227 (1987) (holding
that Arkansas statute providing for exemption of newspapers and religious, professional, trade,
and sports journals from sales tax violated First and Fourteenth Amendments); Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (holding that Texas statute exempting religious periodicals
from state sales and use tax violated Establishment Clause of First Amendment).
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non-exempt taxpayers have standing to challenge the constitutionality of
state tax exemptions. The Supreme Court based its holding in Arkansas
Writers' Project on two factors. 31 First, the Supreme Court commented that
to deny standing to non-exempt taxpayers would result in a segregation of
underinclusive statutes from constitutional challenge. 32 Second, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that allowing standing in these actions was consistent
with prior adjudication by the Court regarding similarly situated plaintiffs.33
On the merits of these two cases, the Supreme Court found both state tax
exemptions unconstitutional because the exemptions violated the establish-
ment clause of the First Amendment and the free press clause to the United
States Constitution.34 Against this background, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered similar issues of standing and
constitutionality in an action brought to enjoin the enforcement of the Tax
Exemption in Finlator v. Powers, 902 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1990).
In Finlator the Fourth Circuit first considered whether plaintiffs had
standing to bring the suit and then dealt with plaintiffs' claims that the tax
exemption statute was unconstitutional. Five of the plaintiffs in Finlaior
were book purchasers who separately bought non-sacred books and literature
of the Jewish, Hindu, and Hare Krishna faiths. The other two plaintiffs
were booksellers who collected the state's sales tax from the purchasers at
the time of sale and subsequently remitted the tax to the Secretary of
Revenue of the State of North Carolina (the Secretary).
The plaintiffs sued the Secretary, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of
the Tax Exemption which exempts the Holy Bible from state sales and use
taxation. The plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of the Tax
Exemption, claiming that the exemption violated both the establishment
clause and the free press clause of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. The Secretary moved to dismiss the case pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending that the plaintiffs
failed to allege any injury and, therefore, lacked standing to pursue the
claims of their complaint. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs
lacked standing.
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the requisite standing as non-
exempt parties, and alternatively as taxpayers, entitled the plaintiffs to
maintain a proper cause of action. Noting that dismissals are reviewed de
novo on appeal, the Fourth Circuit first considered whether plaintiffs had
31. Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 221.
32. Id. at 227.
33. Id.
34. See Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 227 (holding that Arkansas statute
providing for exemption of newspapers and religious, professional, trade, and sports journals
from sale tax violated First and Fourteenth Amendments); Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 8
(holding that Texas statute exempting religious periodicals from state sales and use tax violated
Establishment Clause of First Amendment).
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suffered an actual injury and, therefore, had the requisite standing to
maintain their claims against the Secretary. Reviewing the Supreme Court's
decisions in Arkansas Writers' Project and Texas Monthly, the Fourth
Circuit interpreted these decisions to hold that non-exempt taxpayers have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of state tax exemptions. The
Secretary challenged the Fourth Circuit's interpretation, arguing that tax-
exempt taxpayers must take certain minimal steps to ensure their standing.
According to the Secretary's argument, these steps include contesting the
tax prior to payment, refusing to pay the tax, paying the tax under protest,
paying the tax, and seeking a refund or taking some other action to permit
the state to redress the taxpayer's injuries.
Despite acknowledging that the plaintiffs had taken none of these
minimal steps, the Fourth Circuit rejected the Secretary's argument that
non-exempt taxpayers must take certain minimal steps to ensure their
standing. The Fourth Circuit stated that requiring non-exempt taxpayers to
take these steps would not improve the quality of the parties' advocacy,
enhance the posture of the case, clarify the legal issues, or contribute in
any way to the Fourth Circuit's ability to resolve the questions presented
by the parties. The Fourth Circuit noted that, if denied standing upon the
Secretary's argument, plaintiffs merely would pro'test the payment and
collection of the state tax and refile the suit.
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs suffered actual
injury because the Secretary had imposed additional burdens on the plaintiffs
not placed on purchasers of Holy Bibles. Next, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that denying standing to the plaintiffs would be a waste of judicial resources
because of the blatant unconstitutionality of the Tax Exemption. The Fourth
Circuit also held that even though plaintiffs had no explicit legal obligation
to pay the sales tax to the State, the language of the statute contained an
implicit legal obligation to pay the tax at the time of sale.
After holding that plaintiffs had the requisite standing, the Fourth
Circuit next addressed the constitutionality of the Tax Exemption. The
plaintiffs contended that the Tax Exemption, which exempted the Holy
Bible from state taxation, violated the United States Constitution for two
reasons. First, the plaintiffs argued that the Tax Exemption violated the
establishment clause of the First Amendment, and second, the plaintiffs
contended that the Tax Exemption violated the free press clause of the First
Amendment.
In finding that the Tax Exemption violated the establishment clause of
the First Amendment, the Fourth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's
decision in Texas Monthly. The Supreme Court, in Texas Monthly, held
unconstitutional a state tax exemption which applied to religious literature,
but not to other types of literature. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
tax exemption in the instant case presented a more untenable violation
because the Tax Exemption applied to a religious text sacred only to
members of Christian faiths.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit found that the Tax Exemption violated the
free press clause of the First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Writers' Project, which held that a
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state tax scheme exempting certain classes of magazines, including religious
publications, violated the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the
press because of its content-based discrimination. Applying the Arkansas
Writers' Project decision to the instant case, the Fourth Circuit found that
the Tax Exemption differentiated between a Christian sacred text and other
publications. The Fourth Circuit held that this distinction forced the State
to discriminate on the basis of the content of a book, a basis intolerable
under the First Amendment. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit ordered North
Carolina to permanently enjoin the enforcement of the Tax Exemption.
The Fourth Circuit decision in Finlator brings the circuit into accord
with the Supreme Court's decisions in both Arkansas Writers' Project and
Texas Monthly on the separate issues of standing of nonexempt taxpayers
and of the constitutionality of state tax exemptions of religious literature.
The effect of the Fourth Circuit decision, however, eases the requirement
for standing as compared with the cited Supreme Court precedent. Although
the Fourth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court in neither Arkansas
Writers' Project nor Texas Monthly specifically required minimal steps to
establish standing, the plaintiffs in those cases took such steps to protest
the respective tax exemptions. 5 Because the plaintiffs in Finlator did not
take such steps, the Fourth Circuit recognized such minimal steps as
unnecessary for a plaintiff to establish standing to bring a suit. While the
response to the Fourth Circuit's holding may not bring a flood of litigation,
the Fourth Circuit appears to have opened the doors to litigants who
previously may not have had standing to bring similar suits.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution prohibits states from depriving any person of his life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. 6 In Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), the United States Supreme Court developed a three
factor test to determine what process is due before the government may
deprive a citizen of a property right: the effect of the government action
on the private interest; the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private
interest from the present process; and the effect on the government interest
from the additional procedural requirements.Y In Cleveland Board of Ed-
ucation v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), the Supreme Court held that
when a state has created a property interest in public employment, the state
must provide some type of hearing prior to taking away the property interest
to comply with the due process requirements under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
38
The United States Supreme Court never has addressed the issue of
whether a state violates the Due Process Clause when it fails to follow
35. See Arkansas Writers Project, 481 U.S. at 225 (explaining that plaintiffs protested
by contesting tax exemption initially); Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 6 (explaining that plaintiffs
protested by seeking refund of tax).
36. U.S. CoNsM. amend XIV, §1.
37. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
38. Cleveland Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
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state-created procedures that provide more process for the protection of a
property right than the Constitution would require. Other courts that have
considered the issue have determined that a state's violation of its own laws
providing more process than the federal standard does not necessarily violate
the Due Process Clause.39 In Riccio v. County of Fairfax, 907 F.2d 1459
(4th Cir. 1990), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered first, whether a county police force complied with federal due
process standards when the police force discharged a county police officer
and, second, whether the failure of the police force to comply with state-
created procedures that exceeded the federal due process requirements
constituted a violation of the police officer's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
In Riccio the plaintiff, Gary Riccio (Riccio), was a county police officer
for Fairfax County, Virginia. A young female acquaintance of Riccio
reported that Riccio had placed several obscene phone calls to her. The
Fairfax County Police Department (the Department) immediately began an
investigation through its Internal Affairs Section. In an interview with
Sergeant Steven Hardgrove, Riccio denied making the calls and presented
an alibi concerning the dates and times of the calls. The next day, Hardgrove
suspended Riccio, with pay, during the investigation and told Riccio to
refrain from discussing the investigation with anyone. Later that day Riccio
received written notice that the Department was investigating him for
violations of Department regulation 201.3 (obedience to laws and regula-
tions). After a series of meetings with Riccio, Hardgrove discovered that
Riccio had violated orders by discussing the investigation with other police
personnel, and that Riccio had given conflicting stories to Hardgrove.
Hardgrove presented his final report (Hardgrove Report) to the Chief
of Police recommending that Riccio be held in violation of regulation 201.3,
as well as regulation 210.20 (governing truthfulness) because of Riccio's
conflicting statements and regulation 205.1 (governing insubordination) be-
cause of Riccio's failure to refrain from discussing the investigation. While
containing the Department's evidence against Riccio, the Hardgrove Report
omitted any mention of Riccio's alibi defense. After a meeting in which the
Department gave Riccio a chance to explain his side of the story to his
supervisor and the Commander of the Patrol Bureau, the latter found Riccio
to be in violation of the previously mentioned regulations and terminated
his employment. Pursuant to section 305.4 of the Department's General
Orders, Riccio appealed to a hearing panel. After a lengthy evidentiary
hearing in which both the Department and Riccio presented numerous
39. See Brandon v. District of Columbia Board of Parole, 823 F.2d 644, 648-49 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (refusing to determine process required under Fourteenth Amendment by state's
definition of substantive property interest and, therefore, rejecting proposition that individuals
have constitutional due process right to force states to comply with any procedural rules
promulgated by state); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1298 (6th Cir. 1980) (same); Slotnick
v. Stavinsky, 560 F.2d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 1977) (same).
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witnesses, the hearing panel sustained the charges. Riccio appealed again,
this time to a Special Police Hearing Panel, which held a de novo investi-
gation without the admission of the Hardgrove Report. Nonetheless, the
Special Police Hearing Panel also sustained the charges.
Riccio then brought suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 alleging a
violation of procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
and naming the County of Fairfax, the Chief of Police and various Fairfax
County officials as defendants. After a hearing on the summary judgment
motions of both parties, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia found for the defendants, reasoning that the Department
had provided Riccio with sufficient federal due process and that any
violations of state procedural laws did not rise to constitutional significance.
Riccio appealed, alleging error in both the district court's finding of suffi-
cient federal due process and its finding that the state due process violations
did not rise to constitutional level.
To determine whether Riccio received satisfactory process under the
federal standard, the Fourth Circuit relied on the principles the United
States Supreme Court developed in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loud-
ermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). In Loudermill the Court held that, in an
employee's pretermination hearing, the government must provide the em-
ployee oral or written notice of the pending charges, an explanation of the
employer's evidence against the employee, and a chance to present the
employee's side of the story. Before applying the Loudermill factors to the
case at bar, the Fourth Circuit noted that the considerable amount of
process the Department had provided Riccio prior to its decision to terminate
him established a formidable presumption against the Due Process Clause
violations that Riccio alleged. The court then addressed Riccio's specific
due process allegations, noting that even though the Department could have
treated Riccio more impartially, the Department's treatment did not violate
the Loudermill test. Although Riccio received written notice of only one of
the charges against him, the Fourth Circuit observed that Hardgrove effec-
tively put Riccio on notice of all charges against him during a series of
meetings between Hardgrove and Riccio. Although the Department did not
furnish Riccio with a copy of the Hardgrove report, the Fourth Circuit
found that no violation of Loudermill resulted from the Department's failure
to give Riccio an internal employer document that Riccio did not request.
Finally, although the Hardgrove report did not contain Riccio's alibi evi-
dence, the Fourth Circuit determined that Riccio had sufficient opportunity
to present his alibis and any other mitigating evidence at the hearing with
his supervisor and the Commander of the Patrol Bureau. The Fourth Circuit
dismissed other alleged Due Process violations, noting that the state was
not required to give a government, employee facing termination of employ-
ment all the protections afforded to a criminal defendant. The Fourth
Circuit, therefore, concluded that the process the Department gave to Riccio
satisfied the due process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Considering Riccio's second ground for appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted
that the United States Supreme Court had failed to address the exact issue,
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but that other circuits had held that a violation of state rules was not
necessarily a violation of the Due Process Clause when those rules provided
more process than the federal standard would require. The Fourth Circuit
also noted that it had reached an apparent opposite conclusion when
construing violations of the same statute at issue in the present case in
Kersey v. Shipley, 673 F.2d 730 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 836
(1982). In Kersey the Fourth Circuit's dicta stated that Virginia policemen
possessed due process rights to the extent of the state's procedural guarantees
and that a due process violation occurred only if the employer violated
these guarantees. Although the Kersey court found no due process violation
because the employer had complied with the state's procedures, the Riccio
court noted that Kersey could be read as binding the court to find a due
process violation whenever an employer violated the state's procedures.
In rejecting any binding effect on the court from the dicta in Kersey,
the Fourth Circuit first noted that the Kersey holding conflicted with the
Supreme Court's principle in Loudermill. The Loudermill Court determined
that, although a state was free to define a substantive property right, the
state could not define what procedures were constitutionally adequate to
deprive a person of such a right. Recognizing a definite division between
substance and procedure, the Loudermill Court stated that once a state
creates a right to due process, the Constitution determines what process is
due. The Fourth Circuit determined that Kersey's extension of constitutional
due process to the level defined by state procedures would force the court
to defer to the state on the ultimate issue of whether a constitutional
violation existed. The Fourth Circuit conceded that Kersey's dicta was typical
of the approach rejected emphatically by the Supreme Court in Loudermill.
The Fourth Circuit also noted that, by holding that a violation of state
procedures resulted in a Due Process Clause violation, the court would be
taking away the necessary flexibility of the due process doctrine.
The Fourth Circuit then concluded that the Department's violation of
the state-created procedures exceeding federal due process requirements did
not necessarily compel a finding that the state had violated Riccio's due
process rights. The court suggested that a different conclusion might lie
where the additional state procedures reduced the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of a property interest. The Fourth Circuit, however, examined
the facts of the case at bar and determined that the extra procedures only
would have served to give Riccio additional notice of matters which he
already had effective notice. Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that ad-
ditional state procedures did not reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of Riccio's property interest and that the state's violation of these procedures
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The
Fourth Circuit, therefore, rejected the implied holding in Kersey and held
that a state's violations of state laws providing more process than the
Constitution would require are not necessarily violations of the Due Process
Clause. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district
court.
By holding that the state was not free to define what procedures were
constitutionally adequate to deprive a person of a state-created property
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right, Riccio brings the Fourth Circuit in line with the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Loudermil. 4° The Fourth Circuit's holding in Riccio is
also in accord with several other circuits that have concluded that a state's
failure to adhere to state-created procedural rules which exceed federal due
process requirements does not violate the United States Constitution.
41
Section 1962 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act of 1970 (RICO), 18 U.S.C. section 1962 (1988), prohibits the operation
of, or participation in, an enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering.
This section encompasses direct or indirect participation in a pattern of
racketeering as well as conspiracies to engage in a pattern of racketeering
activities. Section 1961 of RICO, 18 U.S.C. section 1961 (1988), defines the
predicate acts that may constitute a pattern of racketeering. Transportation
of obscene material in interstate commerce for sale and distribution is a
predicate act for the purposes of section 1961.42 In addition to the criminal
penalties of imprisonment and fines for a criminal conviction under RICO
section 1962, section 1963 provides for the forfeiture of any interest that
the violator acquired or maintained through racketeering activity and any
interest that affords the violator the opportunity to engage in racketeering
activity. United States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir. 1990), represents
the first application of the RICO forfeiture provision, section 1963, in which
obscenity violations were the predicate acts that constituted the pattern of
racketeering activity.
In Pryba the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered whether RICO's forfeiture provision violated the First Amend-
ment when the predicate offenses are obscenity violations or whether the
forfeiture provision constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit also reviewed the district
court's use of prior state court obscenity convictions to prove predicate acts
of racketeering, and the district court's exclusion of surveys concerning the
40. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541 (holding that state-created substantive rights were
separate from constitutionally adequate procedures).
41. See Brandon, 823 F.2d at 648-49 (rejecting proposal that individuals have constitu-
tional due process right to force states to comply with state-created procedural rules that
provide more process than Due Process Clause would require); Bills, 631 F.2d at 1298 (same);
Slotnick, 560 F.2d at 34 (same). See also Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep. School District, 732
F.2d 1243, 1245 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
requires no greater coherence with extra-constitutional protections when they are adopted by
state agencies than Due Process Clause requires when such protections are adopted by federal
agencies); Morris v. City of Danville, 744 F.2d 1041, 1048 n.9 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that
mere fact state agency violates its own procedures does not, ipso facto, mean that agency has
violated federal due process requirements); South Central Terminal Co. v. United States Dept.
of Energy, 728 F. Supp. 1083 (D. Del. 1990) (holding that state agency violation of own
procedures does not automatically rise to level of constitutional violation); Tietjen v. United
States Veteran's Admin., 692 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Ariz. 1988), aff'd, 884 F.2d 514 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that agency's mere violation of own regulation does not rise to level of violation
of Due Process Clause).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1988).
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community's opinion of sexually explicit materials. Additionally, the Fourth
Circuit considered the defendants' challenges to several of the district court's
jury instructions.
The defendants in Pryba included Educational Books, Inc., Dennis and
Barbara Pryba, the owners of B & D Corporation and Educational Books,
Inc., and Jennifer Williams, the president of B & D Corporation. Educa-
tional Books, Inc. and B & D Corporation operated nine video rental stores
and three bookstores in Northern Virginia. The government acquired in-
dictments against the defendants following an obscenity investigation during
which investigators opened memberships with the video retail centers and
rented or purchased sexually explicit video tapes and magazines. To prove
the predicate offenses for the RICO violations, the government introduced
the tapes and magazines alleged to be obscene. At the first phase of the
defendants' bifurcated trial on the RICO violation action basqd on obscenity
violations, the jury found six magazines and four video tapes that the
investigators rented or purchased to be obscene. Accordingly, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia imposed fines upon
the defendants and sentenced the individual defendants to varying terms of
imprisonment, which the trial court suspended in favor of probation.
During the second phase of the trial, the jury heard an additional week
of testimony on the issue of forfeiture under RICO section 1963(a)(1).
Ultimately, the jury convicted the individuals and Educational Books, Inc.
for participating in a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of RICO
section 1962(a). The jury further found that the Pryba's and Educational
Books Inc.'s president, Williams, were employed by a criminal enterprise
engaged in racketeering activities in violation of RICO section 1962(c).
Additionally, the jury convicted all defendants for conspiring to participate
in a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of RICO section 1962(d).
As predicate acts for the RICO convictions, the jury relied upon the
individual defendant's and Educational Books, Inc.'s earlier federal obscen-
ity convictions in the first phase of the trial and upon Educational Book,
Inc.'s prior state court obscenity conviction. Finding that the defendants
had certain interests in property which afforded them a source of influence
over the enterprise, the jury directed the defendants to forfeit all shares of
stock in the corporations, along with corporate assets, certain real estate,
and motor vehicles pursuant to section 1963, RICO's forfeiture provision.
To enforce the jury's verdict, the government padlocked the doors of the
three bookstores and nine video rental shops.
On the defendants' pretrial motion to dismiss the RICO counts in the
indictment, the-district court first addressed the defendants' constitutional
challenges to the potential application of RICO's criminal forfeiture pro-
vision to the alleged obscenity violations. In considering the defendants'
constitutional challenges, the district court initially emphasized that Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), made unmistakably clear that obscenity
was not constitutionally protected speech. According to the district court,
while Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), modified the Roth test for
discerning obscenity, the Supreme Court remained committed to the task
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of drawing a line between obscenity and constitutionally protected speech.
The district court specifically rejected the defendants' claim that the use
of RICO in the obscenity context chills protected speech due to the breadth
and vagueness of the underlying obscenity offense. Again citing Roth, the
district court found that the predicate act of obscenity for a RICO violation
gave adequate warning of the conduct proscribed, allowing courts to fairly
administer the law. Responding to the defendants' assertion that RICO's
forfeiture provision acts as an impermissible prior restraint, the district
court characterized the forfeiture provision as subsequent punishment and
noted that any resultant chilling effect was a legitimate attempt to deter
proscribed, unprotected speech. Moreover, the district court concluded that
the forfeiture provision did not impermissibly restrain further dissemination
of speech, but rather simply requires those engaged in racketeering acts to
relinquish illicit profits. Addressing the defendants' claim that RICO's
forfeiture provision constituted excessive fines or cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the Eight Amendment, the district court noted that
while defendants' claim may require a proportionality analysis, such analysis
would have to wait until the matter was tried. Accordingly, the district
court denied defendants' motion to dismiss.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit following the jury's convictions on the
obscenity and RICO offenses, the defendants again claimed that the RICO
statute and its forfeiture provisions violated the First Amendment when the
predicate offenses were obscenity violations. The defendants first argued
that the post-trial forfeiture of property under RICO constituted a prior
restraint of the defendants' protected right of expression under the First
Amendment. The defendants asserted that the RICO forfeiture provision
allows the government to restrain expressive material without first demon-
strating its obscenity as required under Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51 (1965). The Fourth Circuit distinguished Freedman as a censorship case
and concluded that Freedman was irrelevant on the issue of criminal
sanctions. The court further concluded that the evidence established a nexus
between the defendants' profits from the racketeering activities and the
protected materials that the court ordered the defendants to forfeit. Ac-
cording to the court, the First Amendment would not allow the defendants
to protect profits from racketeering activities by investing such profits in
newspapers, magazines, radio, and television stations. The defendants next
argued that forfeiture of nonobscene material has a chilling effect on the
defendants' right of expression. In response to this claim, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that a prison term and a large fine also would have a chilling
effect on the right of expression, but such penalties are constitutional.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the subsequent punishment
that RICO's forfeiture provision imposed was constitutional.
The defendants' also argued that RICO's forfeiture provision violated
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment or
excessive fines. The Fourth Circuit declined to engage in a proportionality
review of the relation of the forfeiture to the crime because the Fourth
Circuit found that the forfeiture provision was not sufficiently severe to
trigger proportionality review.
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In addition to defendant's First and Eighth Amendment arguments, the
defendants contended that the district court improperly admitted into evi-
dence Educational Books, Inc.'s fifteen prior state court obscenity convic-
tions as part of the pattern of racketeering proof. The defendants argued
that the government must relitigate the acts underlying the state conviction
in the federal RICO action. Finding this claim to be without merit, the
Fourth Circuit cited Myers v. United States, 49 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1931),
which held that a defendant's guilty plea in state court to possession of
liquor was admissible in a federal court prosecution for the sale of liquor.
The defendants further challenged the district court's exclusion of a
public opinion survey that a Duke University professor conducted. Through
the survey, the defendants sought to demonstrate the community's attitude
and standards regarding sexually explicit materials. Noting the difficulty of
describing the visual impact of the magazines and video tapes, the Fourth
Circuit approved the district court's exclusion of the survey as well as the
district court's reasoning. In excluding the survey, the district court had
reasoned that the communicative impact of a video may be patently offensive
while a verbal description of the video may fail to adequately convey to
the survey interviewee the true nature of the material in question. Further-
more, relying upon Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973),
the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's determination that the jury
did not need assistance from experts on the issue of obscenity once the
allegedly obscene material was in evidence.
The defendants in Pryba also challenged the district court's jury instruc-
tions both in regard to the test for obscenity and to the RICO conspiracy
count. While the defendants asserted that the test for obscenity is a com-
munity's toleration for sexually oriented material, i.e., what a community
will put up with, permit or allow, the Fourth Circuit relied upon the
Supreme Court's obscenity test as articulated in Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973). Finding no error in the district court's instruction on
obscenity, the Fourth Circuit cited Miller for the proposition that the jury
must decide the issue of obscenity as would the average person applying
contemporary community standards as a whole, not upon the standards of
the most prudish or most tolerant.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the defendants' claim that to prove a
violation of the RICO conspiracy section, section 1962(d), the government
must prove that a defendant personally agreed to commit two or more
specified predicate crimes. Instead, the Fourth Circuit approved the district
court's instruction that the government must prove either that the defendant
personally agreed to commit or assist two or more predicate crimes or that
each defendant agreed that another coconspirator would commit two or
more acts of racketeering. According to the Fourth Circuit, to adopt
defendants' position would add an element to RICO conspiracy that Con-
gress did not direct.4
3
43. But see United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 923 (2d Cir.) (finding conspiracy
